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ABSTRACT
EXECUTIVE INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DECISIONS: THE RISK
MANAGEMENT CHANNEL
Jeremy Skog

Greg Nini

This paper provides evidence that insurance executives
respond to their compensation incentives by adjusting
observable risk-management policy variables – the
reinsurance purchase decision, type of business conducted,
and firm leverage. Executive incentives are modeled by the
executive sensitivity of wealth to stock price (Delta) and
stock volatility (Vega). Firms respond to increased
executive incentives to bear risk by purchasing less
reinsurance, but also conducting less business in long-tailed
lines – a change which rewards the executive through
increased market volatility. The cost of altering executive
incentives to effect firm policy is much less than a similar
change in firm structural variables.
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1. Introduction
The risk management decision is of fundamental importance to any firm and must
be addressed by boards of directors when deciding which managers to hire and how best
to compensate them for their labor. To the extent that any policy decision made by the
firm is determined by its managers, analyzing a company’s risk-management policy
without simultaneously analyzing the motivations of the management can give only
partial insight into the reasons behind any decision. This study examines the effect of
executive compensation incentives on the risk management decisions of insurance
companies.
The managerial motivation literature can be divided into two major approaches.
One approach attempts to model the decision made by the manager in a principal-agent
framework where the goal of compensation design is to urge the manager to expend a
high level of effort on the firm. I do not follow this technique as the anecdotal problem is
not to get managers to expend a high level of effort, but for them to spend that effort on
value-creating activities for the benefit of stockholders rather than on perquisites with
private benefits which they alone enjoy. I focus on the second approach, examining the
pay-for-performance sensitivity measurement. In these studies, the empirical goal is to
identify the relationship between managerial decisions and the incentives contained in the
structure of the manager's compensation package. These sensitivities provide a measure
of how the manager’s payoff varies with the rewards to shareholders and, consequently,
of how closely the incentives of the managers are aligned with those of the firm's owners.
I particularly investigate the observable decisions associated with a company’s riskmanagement policies.
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the largest publicly-traded insurance groups from 1992 to 2004, combining operating
information from regulatory filings with publicly available information on the
compensation of their executives. Because the handling and measurement of risk is the
primary business of insurance companies, these firms should particularly focus on this
part of their firm’s decisions. By focusing on a single industry, I am also able to examine
the firm’s decisions at a close level and make use of decision variables specific to the
industry. The use of the reinsurance variable and business-specific leverage measures is a
significant improvement to the literature as it allows me to directly measure a company’s
risk-taking and exposure to bankruptcy risk in the company’s main line of business as
opposed to the more noisy proxies used in studies such as Coles, Daniel, and Naveen,
(2006), Tufano (1996), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997), Rogers (2002), Anderson,
Bates, Bizjak, and Lemmon (2000), Baghat and Welch (1995). Proxies have included
leverage, corporate focus, research and development, and capital expenditure, and find
mixed results. As the risk due to the insurance policies written by the firm cannot be
easily hedged through derivatives contracts, reinsurance can provide a more complete
measure of risk exposure. The decision of how many premiums to write relative to capital
reserves is likely a substitute for this decision and I examine it as another risk decision
made by the management. If managers respond to board-given incentives, then it is
possible for the board of directors to induce shareholder-desired corporate policies
through careful design of the compensation package. As incentives are mainly
determined by board-adjustable option parameters such as the time-to-maturity of the
options, it should be possible for companies to change their risk-profile over time in the
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design executive compensation packages to increase shareholder value.
I find that, when accounting for relations between companies and structural policy
decisions, the incentives given to the management have the ability to alter some aspects
of the firm’s risk-management decisions, although whether this actually increases the
risk-profile of the firm is unclear. Depending on the measurement variable, results are
mixed, indicating that rewarding managers for bearing risk, as measured through their
reported compensation schemes, may actually encourage firms to conduct less business in
risky lines, although they retain more of this business on their own books. Managerial
incentives appear to play some role in determining firm decisions and the riskmanagement decision appears to be a potential path through which managerial incentives
may affect firm performance, although the market’s valuation of these decisions is weak.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section reviews the
existing literature of corporate risk-management and the role of executive compensation.
Section three describes the sources of the data on insurance companies and the
compensation of their managers. Sections four and five describe the empirical set-up and
results. Section six focuses on various robustness tests. Section seven concludes.
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2. Literature Review and Identification of Contributions
2.1 Reinsurance Literature
Executives are concerned with their firm’s risk management because of the many
benefits it provides to the various stakeholders in the firm. Shareholders gain value from
reduced financing costs because of a lower discount rate due to larger and more stable
cash-flows which reduce the chance of incurring bankruptcy costs (Stulz, 1996). Value is
created through various channels including the level and type of projects chosen by
managers, debt and tax costs, expected bankruptcy costs as well as lower transaction
costs with other stakeholders and counterparties due to the increased likelihood of
continuing the business relationship. Employees of the firm benefit from financial
rewards and increased stability as they cannot diversify their employment risk as
shareholders can with their financial risk.
Managers have several reasons, which are explained below (Stulz (1990), Stulz
(1984), Mayers and Smith (1982)), to control the risk exposure of a firm and to adjust this
exposure according to their personal preferences, which likely differ from those of
shareholders. This differential creates agency costs from the shareholder’s perspective
and leads shareholders to take action to try and reduce these costs since managers, even
while they may principally act in the shareholder’s interest, are at the same time pursuing
their own private goals.
Agency problems may result from several factors. First, managers likely have a
higher proportion of their wealth invested in the firm, as well as relying on the firm’s
continued existence for their current and expected future income. Managers also depend
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aspects of compensation may include awards, reputation, and the potential for promotion.
If corporate risk management increases shareholder value, then actions by executives to
reduce risk will also be desired by shareholders. Since it is often impossible or illegal for
executives to hedge their financial exposure to a firm, they may attempt to conduct this
hedging at the corporate, rather than the individual, level.
Though shareholders and managers may both find risk management beneficial,
conflict between management and shareholders may arise if they desire different levels of
hedging. Because they are assumed to have risk-averse utility functions, the management
may wish to hedge beyond the point where hedging increases firm value - managers are
primarily interested in the value of hedging in preventing bankruptcy rather than benefits
from value creation through tax savings, reduced underinvestment and asset substitution
problems and more optimal risk sharing. This may lead managers to implement strategies
which, while decreasing the risk of bankruptcy, actually lower the overall value of the
firm. A firm might engage in diversification through conglomerate-building or enter into
lines of business where the company cannot add value (Bartam, 2000), for example.
Empirically, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2003) show that firms whose managers are
rewarded for bearing risk are more focused in their business activities.
Thus, the incentives given through contracts and compensation need to be
carefully constructed to avoid incenting managers towards value-destroying activities
while still rewarding value-creating ones. Most companies accomplish this linkage by
tying employee compensation to stock price rather than accounting targets, which are
often under some managerial control and may be easier to manipulate. Incentives, which
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reduce managerial risk aversion but may also induce speculative behavior - while tying
rewards directly to stock price may even decrease the manager’s desire to bear risk.
Empirical studies such as Schrand and Unal (1998), Tufano (1996), Haushalter
(1997), Gay and Nam (1998) have shown that executives who are paid with more option
compensation tend to hedge less, lending credence to the behavior-altering abilities of
incentives. Ross (2004) shows that there is no incentive schedule that can make all
expected-utility-maximizing managers less risk averse so grants must be tailored by the
corporate boards to individual circumstances. In addition, Ju, Leland and Senbet (2002)
show that the effect of options may be indeterminate, inducing either too much or too
little risk taking depending on the underlying utility function and investment technology.
Lewellyn (2003) and Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2005) provide evidence that
options, especially if they are in the money, could discourage risk taking. This is because
in-the-money options lose the convexity of their payouts and offer a payout schedule
more like that of restricted or pure stock. Stock has been shown in Stulz (1984) to
exacerbate risk aversion because it reduces the manager’s diversification of wealth.
Existing research has studied various financial and operating decisions from a
corporate risk-management framework. In general there are few conclusive results.
Financial strategy – measured by leverage, share repurchases, or derivative use – tends to
be (weakly) related to managerial stock and options ownership. Operating decisions such
as expanding into a new line of business or investing in research and development also
appear to be related to managerial compensation.
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risk and decreasing hedging activities. DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990) demonstrate
that firms which approve stock option plans for executives display an increase in stock
return variance, and Guay (1999) shows that the standard deviation of returns are
associated with contemporaneous vega, the sensitivity of executive wealth to a change in
stock volatility. Demonstrating how incentives granted in one year may take time to be
implemented and to have an effect on observable firm decisions, Rajgopal and Shevlin
(2002) show that lagged vega is associated with increased oil exploration risk. Providing
further evidence of the effect of incentives, Knopf, Nam and Thornton (2002) show that
the use of derivatives is negatively associated with Vega and positively associated with
delta. Examining other risk measures, Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000) find that leverage
and stock return volatility are both positively related to the elasticity of CEO wealth in
stock return volatility.
This paper contributes to this literature by using a purer measure of risk-bearing
and a comprehensive dataset of the insurance industry. By examining firms at the
insurance group level, I can eliminate capital cost, internal risk shifting, tax, and other
reasons why companies might appear to be purchasing reinsurance but are actually just
shifting it within the firm. By limiting the data set to the insurance industry I examine
firms which have advanced risk-management strategies and I am able to reduce the
unobservable differences between firms. I am also able to examine and use industryspecific variables which should affect a firm’s risk-bearing decision.
I also demonstrate that incentives appear to lead to changes in company policy,
implying a role for compensation in directing corporate decisions. As most firm decisions
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managerial team in any study of firm decision-making.

2.2 Hypotheses and Decision Variables
Based on the literature I make several hypotheses on the role of executive
incentives in firm decisions. These hypotheses are given below and the empirical
techniques used to test them are examined in section 4 of this paper.

2.2.1 Firm Decisions
If managers are responding to the increased rewards for risk by increasing the
volatility of firm earnings then they should do so by altering the level of observable firmrisk variables.
Hypothesis 1) Ceteris paribus, managers with a higher level of vega should
increase the level of risk in firm-decision variables.
To measure risk and determine if managers are attempting to make riskier
decisions, I examine several observable variables which capture a variety of insurer
decisions that affect the risk of their business.

2.2.2 Risk Management and Volatility
If these variables are to have an effect on the managerial incentives tied to stock
performance, then it is necessary that riskier actions should increase the volatility of stock
returns:
Hypothesis 2) Ceteris paribus, riskier choices in the firm decision variables
should increase the volatility of stock returns for the insurance group.
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when setting their firm policies and the rewards that they see from their incentive pay.
This link is necessary if managers are translating their incentives into observable firm
decisions through the risk management channel.

2.2.3 Reinsurance
This study examines the reinsurance purchase decisions made by insurance
companies as one way in which they manage their risk-management decisions. The use of
the reinsurance variable allows a direct measure of an insurance company’s risk-bearing
and exposure to bankruptcy risk in the company’s main line of business, as opposed to
the more noisy proxies used in other studies such as those mentioned in the section 1.
Proxies have included leverage, corporate focus, research and development, and capital
expenditure, and they find mixed results. The risk to the firm due to writing insurance
policies cannot be easily hedged through derivatives contracts and therefore reinsurance
can provide a more complete measure of this particular risk exposure. A higher level of
vega should be associated with less reinsurance purchase and more risk retained by the
firm.

2.2.4 Premium/Surplus Ratio
Concurrently with determining its reinsurance purchase a firm is determining
what amount of insurance policies, and their associated expected risk as measured by
premiums, it should write in relation to its surplus. Surplus is the reserve that insurance
companies keep to protect them from larger-than-expected losses and hence the
likelihood of ruin. A larger ratio makes bankruptcy more likely for the firm and is
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levels of vega.

2.2.5 Proportion of Business in Long-Tailed Lines
Certain lines of business expose the firm to more risk than others. These are
known as schedule-P or long-tailed lines. I use the same definition as in Phillips,
Cummins, and Allen (1996) and shown in Appendix 1. One way for firms to respond to
risk-incentives would be to keep all other firm decision variables constant but simply
conduct more business in riskier lines. I therefore compare the other firm decision
variables with the amount of business conducted in these longer-liability lines. A higher
proportion should be associated with higher levels of vega if firms are increasing risk in
this way.

2.2.6 A.M. Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio
The A.M. Best Capital Adequacy Ratio measures a company's relative capital
strength compared to industry composites as established by A.M. Best and is related to its
premium surplus ratio. The specific calculation is adjusted surplus divided by net
required capital. Adjusted surplus is calculated from reported surplus, which is then
modified with adjustments related to loss reserves, assets, and off-balance-sheet liability
exposures. The net required capital is calculated by separating investments into seven
different risk categories. The capital is then determined as a sum of these, less a
covariance adjustment which controls for the independence of risks across securities
category. This ratio is important in determining the company’s A.M. Best rating and is
therefore another measure of the firm’s leverage decision – one which is specific to
insurance companies. A higher ratio means that the company has more surplus relative to
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associated with higher levels of vega.

2.3 Additional Contributions to the Literature
The main contributions that this paper makes to the literature are further
examining the role of incentives in firm risk decisions within a specific industry using
previously unexamined measures of firm risk-bearing. By focusing on a specific industry
I am able to include industry-specific control variables which are determinants of the
company’s risk-management decision as well as specific measures of risk-bearing.
Because the business of the insurance industry is to manage risk they should have welldeveloped methods of handling risk policy and it should be a major focus of their
management, thus the insurance industry seems ideal for this sort of study. I also examine
whether companies are responding selectively – whether they simply take on riskier
business while keeping the amount of business constant or whether managers make
generally riskier or generally safer decisions. The variables used in this study cover most
of the risk decisions available to insurance firms – types of premiums to write, amount to
retain, and level of capital to back them up.
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3. Data and Variable Creation
3.1 Data Gathering and Merging
Information on the insurance companies and groups is assembled from the yearly
NAIC statements from 1993 through 2004, years which were chosen based on data
availability. Data for the year 1992 was obtained from historical data in the 1993
statement and used for creating lagged values. This insurance data is merged with
information on executives from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database and
Compustat. CRSP data is also used for stock return information. The merging of these
datasets restricts the type of companies which can be included in this study. These
restrictions are explained below and comparisons are made between my specific dataset
and the wider, unrestricted, market datasets.
The NAIC data files give information on the line-level business of insurers in
terms of premiums written and business retained. From this it is possible to construct
variables measuring a firm’s exposure to policies and diversification, discussed below. It
is also possible to determine the volatility and correlation of losses and investment
earnings, which is expected to have an effect on risk decisions. Discrepancies in data
definitions between years are resolved with the goal of producing variables which are as
consistent as possible over the entire data range. This data was merged with the A.M.
Best dataset which provides higher-level summary data on firms and served as a useful
check on my variable calculations. Summary statistics for relevant variables appear in
table 1.

Jeremy Skog

- 13 -

3.1.1 Formation of Insurance Groups
Since an achievement of this study over prior literature is examining a more
overarching ownership structure by studying insurance groups, rather than companies, a
key part was properly tracking group ownership in the universe of insurance companies
over time. Examining reinsurance at the insurance group level separates the actual offloading of risk from internal risk-shifting and capital structure decisions. Examining riskbearing at only the company level may yield spurious results because the risk transfer
may be made for internal cost-of-capital or diversification reasons and may not actually
represent the truly desired risk-management decision. CEO data from Execucomp is at
the level of the insurer holding group so observable firm decisions should be measured at
the same level as the incentives which inspire them. I created a proprietary merge-key to
track group ownership of companies by year as they were merged, acquired and sold. The
identifiers within the AM Best data were often erroneous when combined as panel-data
as the raw data is isolated by year and did not accurately track ownership of companies
over time.
For each insurance group, I created a list of NAIC company codes corresponding
to firms which the group owned in each year and used this to fill in observations where
companies might not be listed under the groups which owned them, including years for
which group ownership data was missing. I created a record of group mergers with the
acquiring group listed as owning all companies previously listed owned by the acquired
group, unless they were specifically listed under another group’s code and hence
ownership. Furthermore, the code number assigned to groups varied over time in the
original AM Best data. These codes were reconciled so that a group was listed under a
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particular group in year t and in year t+2 it as assumed to be owned by the same group in
year t+1 unless specifically noted otherwise. The first year a company appears under
group ownership in the dataset, it is assumed to be owned by that group for all previous
years in the dataset. If the company had been independent, it would have been listed
under its own group heading. By making these assumptions, I account for all missing data
on group ownership.
There was not a pre-existing variable which identified firms in both the NAIC
data and in the COMPUSTAT data. I therefore created a merge-key which was used to
merge the two data sets. Companies were matched as seemed best appropriate on
information such as stock ticker symbol, group name, chief executive name, and
headquarters location. This key was then used to join the data sets. The final result is a
set of panel data identified at the insurer group/year level. There are a total of 77 groups
appearing in the data, although not each one appears in every year due to the changing
nature of the insurance industry and company mergers and acquisitions. The names of
groups appearing appear in Appendix 2.
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3.2 Comparison to Full Data Sets
To determine how the firms in my final dataset compare to the overall datasets in
Execucomp and NAIC, I compare a few key variables to ensure consistency and note
differences between my data and the wider market.

3.2.1 ExecuComp
The characteristics of the insurance industry executives included are broadly
similar to those in the managerial market as a whole, although they exhibit the usual
attributes associated with those who work in the financial world. Coles, Daniel and
Naveen (2006) study the entire Execucomp database for all industries and present
summary statistics which describe that database.
The executives within my data set have almost exactly the same age profile as
those in the larger data set, although they have been at their jobs a somewhat shorter time.
The differences are not statistically significant. Executives in the insurance industry
appear to receive slightly more cash pay than those in the wider data set – an average of
$1.3 million as opposed to $1.1 million in the overall data set. Median pay is higher as
well at around $1 million as opposed to an industry-wide median of $800,000. Pay for the
entire management team is higher as well, with an average of $4.3 million in the
insurance industry compared to $2.5 million in all industries.
The most important difference between the insurance industry and others is its
greater use of incentive compensation. This has grown over time as shown in figure 1,
and composes almost half of an executive’s take-home pay. The average calculated delta
for executives in my data set is 1,039 as compared to an overall average of 600. This
difference appears to be due mainly to a few executives who receive large options
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Execucomp median of 206. The situation is similar with vega. The insurance-CEO
average is 114, compared with a total-industry average of 80. The respective medians are
48 in the insurance industry and 34 across all businesses. The standard deviations in my
data set are larger as well. It appears that the executive market in the insurance industry
pays more than average and makes more use of incentive pay. Further, there are several
CEOs who have very generous pay packages which make large use of incentive pay.
Figure 1:

Annual Compenstion (Thousands of $)
0
500
1,000 1,500 2,000

Components of Compensation
Mean Levels Calculated by Company

1992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004
Salary
Options
Other Compensation
From ExecuComp Data

Bonus
Restricted Stock
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3.2.2 Insurance Company Data (A.M. Best and NAIC)
Due to the process of creating the data set, the included groups are not necessarily
representative of the entire insurance industry. Because the NAIC data was merged with
Execucomp data, only publicly traded companies are included. Execucomp includes data
on top executives (usually the five highest-paid officers) from companies within the S&P
1,500, so an insurer must be a member of this set to be included. The S&P 1,500 is
composed of companies in the S&P 500 large-cap, S&P 400 mid-cap, and S&P 600
small-cap indices. Because this index is dependent on firms still trading, not all
information is available for every company in every year.
To determine how the insurer groups in my dataset compare with past literature
on the subject, I reproduce the regressions from Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003) at
both the company and the insurer group level and present the results in table 2. The form
of the regressions run is given by the equation:
Equation 1:

Ri = α + β1 X i + t + µi
The control variables here, X, are purely the firm structure variables, and do not
include managerial incentives or characteristics. t represents the year dummies and u is an
error term. Since previous studies examined reinsurance purchase rather than risk
retained, the expected signs must be flipped when comparing to previous studies. This
has been done in the ‘predicted’ column of table 2 to make the signs equivalent, and to
simplify comparisons with previous studies.
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study while the group-level regressions allow extrapolation for further results presented
in this paper. The similarities in the results between these regressions show that the
capital-structure story of reinsurance purchase appears to hold at different ownership
levels and that this data set is similar to those used in previous studies. Some differences
would naturally exist because the data is constructed from different sources and over
different time periods, with Garven and Lamm Tenant (2003) using the A.M. Best
database and my using the raw NAIC data to construct the variables.
For the most part, the actions of my included firms appear to be similar to those
results found in the prior study. The signs for significant variables are the same at both
the corporation and group level, indicating that there is not too much bias in observed
firm behavior due to the selection and aggregation into groups. The only times the signs
of the coefficients differ is on the proportion of business on long tailed lines. At the
company level the sign is negative, indicating more risky business is associated with
more reinsurance purchase, while at the group level the coefficient is positive in sign.
This could be due to reinsurance being used to shift risk within the insurer group, while at
the group level insurers are making either generally riskier or generally safer risk
decisions when choosing policy.
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3.3 Chief Variables of Interest
I investigate two categories of variables which are of chief interest in this study.
They are: those which measure the risk decisions of the firm and those which measure the
incentives given to managers.
The first category includes variables which represent the risk management
decisions of the firm. These include the firm’s reinsurance purchase decision – which
measures how much of its premium risk it chooses to keep on its own books. Second, the
proportion of business which is conducted in long-tailed lines, which measures how risky
the insurance company’s business is. There are also two variables which measure the
firm’s capital-structure decision by measuring its leverage. The first of these variables is
the premium/surplus ratio, which measures how much business the company is
conducting in relation to its loss reserves. Second is the A.M. Best Capital Adequacy
ratio ( described fully at:
http://www.ambest.com/ratings/methodology/BCAR_UNDERSTANDING_PC_Insurers.
pdf ) which is a more specific ratio measuring how much capital the firm retains relative
to the business it has underwritten, adjusted for the risk of each.
The variables which measure the incentives given to management include the two
major sensitivity variables – the sensitivity of executive’s wealth to a change in the stock
price and the sensitivity in wealth to a change in stock price volatility. I also examine the
overall level of cash and bonus pay as a proxy for how much the executive receives in
total pay from the firm and how relatively risk-averse the executive is likely to be.

3.3.1 Firm Decision Variables
Reinsurance
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over total business written plus reinsurance assumed as the measure of risk retained by
the firm, similar to the method used in Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003) and Mayers
and Smith (1990). Whereas the two previous studies use reinsurance premiums ceded to
total business premiums as the measure of reinsurance demand, I am interested in the
risk-taking activities of the firm and therefore use the measure of risk retained on the
company’s books. In each case, total business is defined as direct premiums written plus
reinsurance assumed as reported in each year’s NAIC statement. The variable is then
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. Groups retain
about 81% of their portfolio on average and 89% at the median, although there is
significant variation. The three firms which retained none of their business were removed
from the data set as they were likely experiencing abnormal business conditions and not
representative of standard insurance companies.
Premium-Surplus Ratio
Another decision which management can use to determine the firm’s exposure to
bankruptcy is the amount of premiums written relative to the surplus that the firm retains.
This measure can be interpreted in a way similar to the leverage of the firm when
considering debt policy. If the firm incurs too many losses on its business and cannot
cover them by collected premiums and surplus, or by raising new capital, then it will
enter a state of financial distress.
The premium to surplus ratio measures the level of capital surplus relative to
premiums. It is specifically calculated by the amount of direct premiums written divided
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percentile. An insurance company must have an asset heavy balance sheet to pay out
claims. Industry statutory surplus is the amount by which assets exceed liabilities. For
instance: a ratio 0.95 -to 1 means that insurers are writing less than $1.00 worth of
premium for every $1.00 of surplus. A ratio of 1.02-to-1 means insures are writing $1.02
for every $1.00 in surplus. The average ratio is 321% or a ratio of 3.21. This represents a
leverage of $3 of premiums for every $1 of surplus and the mean is affected by a few
highly levered firms. The median ratio is 1.68.
The bankruptcy costs that a high ratio exposes the firm to should lead a more
levered company to purchase more reinsurance. Reinsurance can serve as a substitute for
capital in this way. Powell and Sommer (2007) find evidence that higher leverage leads
to greater reinsurance purchase. Mayers and Smith (1987) explain that the investment
incentive hypothesis predicts that a more levered firm will purchase more reinsurance as
this can help to alleviate the costs of debt and allow greater use of tax shields. Holding
other risk policies constant, a higher vega should be associated with a higher premium
surplus ratio - the theoretical explanations go in the same direction.
A.M. Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio
Best's Capital Adequacy Ratio is a percentage which measures a company's
relative capital strength compared to its industry peer composite. A company's BCAR is
an important component in determining its rating which is often used as a proxy for the
risk of the firm. Capital adequacy ratios are calculated as the net required capital
necessary to support components of underwriting, asset, and credit risks in relation to
economic surplus. Required capital is based upon standard industry practice. The A.M.
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To create my measure I create a weighted average of the ratios for all the constituent
members of the group using each company’s assets as a weight. As before, this variable
is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. This may yield a less naïve measurement of
leverage than the simple premium/surplus ratio, as it takes into account the risks that the
firm faces relative to the norm in the industry. I also check results using the provided
minimum and maximum ratios for each company in an insurer group and find similar
results.
Business in Long-Tailed Lines
An alternative for the firm to increasing the size of its business relative to its
surplus or the amount that is retained is for it to simply write more risky business. I
control for this possibility by examining the amount of business that a firm writes in more
risky lines compared with the effects on the above three variables. If a firm is retaining
more risk and also writing more risky business then both sets of equations should see a
positive coefficient on vega. If the firm is simply writing more risky business, i.e. it is
responding by increasing its risk level but not necessarily in value-adding ways then the
coefficient on long-tailed lines would be positive while that on the other three measures
would be insignificant.
Long-tailed lines are defined in Phillips, Cummins, and Allen (1996) and listed in
Appendix 1. 61% of group business takes place in long lines and 86% of firms conduct at
least some business in them. I check on the relative risk of long-tailed lines as well as
property vs. liability lines in several ways. Table 3 shows several measures of the risk in
every line – the standard deviation of gross losses, the contribution to the company’s risk
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measures gives an indication of the relative risk that they add to the firm. I also
constructed the loss ratio for Schedule P versus non-Schedule P lines and property and
liability lines separately. I examine the variance of the loss ratios to provide a measure of
the relative predictability of losses in these lines, and hence, how much risk they create
for the company. By testing the variances I am able to see if they are significantly
different and if these definitions are actually suitable proxies for the risk a firm’s business
creates. To eliminate doubtful outliers the Schedule P loss ratios were winsorized at the
5% and 95% levels and the property/liability loss ratios were winsorized at the 1% and
9% levels. Once this had been done, I could not reject the null hypothesis that the
variance in loss ratios for Schedule P lines is the same as it is for non-Schedule P lines.
The variance of the loss ratios in property lines is significantly greater than the loss ratio
variance in liability lines, which goes against expectations and theory. This is due to a
few companies on the very upper end of the property-line loss ratio distribution. If the
lines are winsorized at the 10% and 90% levels instead, then the variance of loss ratios
for liability lines is higher than for property lines, although the difference is not
significant in my sample. Still, I include the business conducted in long-tailed lines so
that comparison may be drawn with theories and prior studies, as well as to control for
the type of business which a firm conducts.
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3.3.2 Executive Incentive Variables
Information on executive pay and characteristics were taken from the Execucomp
database provided by COMPUSTAT. Executives in the insurance industry were
identified by the SIC code of their company, limited to 6300-6500. They were then
matched to companies in the NAIC data using the created merge-key described earlier.
The incentives given to CEOs through stock and options are represented by two
variables, measuring the change in an executive’s wealth to changes in company share
price. Using available information and the estimation technique determined by Core and
Guay (2002), the executive wealth sensitivity variables were created. Option values are
calculated using the Black-Scholes option pricing formula and compare closely with
those provided by COMPUSTAT. The estimation technique used is able to determine
fairly accurate values for sensitivities even when all of the option information is not
directly observable and compensates for the sometimes-limited information available
through COMPUSTAT. To control for responsibilities being distributed throughout the
upper-level management, these sensitivities were also calculated for the entire upperlevel management team at each company.
Delta
Delta is the sensitivity of CEO wealth to a one percent change in stock price and
represents the alignment between the incentives of managers and those of stockholders
(Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006). Figure 2 shows how this measure has increased over
time as the use of options in executive compensation has become more popular. A larger
delta increases the rewards from an increase in stock price as the managers now share in
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should work more effectively and direct his effort more productively. Because his payout
parallels that of equity-holders a manager should be relatively less concerned with
bankruptcy risk and should desire to increase the company’s risk-taking. John and John
(1993) show that a high delta may increase the management’s motivations to shift risk to
policy-holders. However, an increase in delta also increases and executive’s expected
wealth to a point further out on the manager’s utility curve. This leads the manager to be
exposed to more risk and as their shareholdings are relatively undiversified compared to
most equity holders, therefore they may also pass over some risky, but positive NPV,
projects as demonstrated in Holmstrom (1979), Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987),
Murphy (1999), Smith and Stulz (1985), and Guay (1999). Thus, delta may exacerbate
the underinvestment problem if insurers focus on safer but less-profitable lines. Mayers
and Smith (1990) report finding that insurance companies with a less diverse ownership
structure demand more reinsurance. This implies that companies with management
whose wealth is more tied to the performance of the firm could lead their firm to
purchase more reinsurance, to the extent that the risk-aversion argument holds in both
cases.
An executive’s delta was created according to the estimation technique described
in Core and Guay (2002). This estimation allows the use of standard Execucomp data,
while achieving a very high reliability when compared to other means of determining
executive wealth and sensitivities. Compared with all companies in the Compustat
database reported in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), the average delta of insurance
industry executives is higher, at 1,039 for a chief executive, as opposed to the previously-
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median of 172. This is a comparison that should be expected as financial companies often
make higher use of options compensation than firms in other industries. My figure
indicates that a 1% increase in stock price would increase the wealth of an average chief
executive by $1 million I examine the within-firm variance of delta to ensure that the
data set has enough heterogeneity. I run a fixed-effect regression on delta with firm and
year dummy variables. The within-firm standard deviation of the residuals is then
calculated and found to be about $730,000. This is less than half of the overall value of
$2 million, but it is evidence that companies are varying their executive incentives over
the years examined in this study.
The CEO’s incentives are calculated at the end of each fiscal year based upon
stock and option holdings as reported by Execucomp. The number of shares held by each
executive is given by the Execucomp variable shrown according to the formula:
max(0,shrown). Each share has a delta of one. The delta of an option is given by the
Black-Scholes formula:
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δ is the continuously compounded expected dividend yield as given by
bs_yield/100 based upon the company’s average dividend yield over the past three years.
If missing, the previous value is used.

σ is the expected volatility of stock returns calculated over 60 months in decimal
units and reported in the variable bs_volat. Again, if missing the previous value is used.
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http://mi.compustat.com.docs-mi.help/blk_schol.htm
S is the stock price at the end of the fiscal year, given by prccf.
K is the strike price of the option, given by expric.
T is the time to maturity of the option determined from the Execucomp variable
exdate and the current year. Assumptions for missing data are explained below:
N(*) is the cumulative standard normal distribution.
Option holdings fall into one of three categories: new grants in each year, existing
grants from prior years which cannot be exercised, and existing grants which can be
exercised. Dividend yield, volatility, risk-free rate and end-of-year stock price are
available for all option categories. Strike price and time-to maturity are available for new
option grants. If the company made an options grant in the most recent fiscal year, then
the time-to-maturity of unexercisable options is set to one year less than the most recent
options grant and the time-to-maturity for exercisable options is four years less than the
most recent options grant. Because K and T are not always available for existing options,
I make certain assumptions based on the Core and Guay methodology. If there was no
recent options grant then unexercisable options are assumed to have a time-to-maturity of
nine years and exercisable options are assumed to have a time-to-maturity of six years.
The minimum time-to-maturity is recoded to be three years for unexercisable options and
one year for exercisable options as lesser values are likely to be miscoded.
CEOs may receive multiple grants in each year. I first calculate the delta of each
grant, multiply it by the number of options in each grant (numsecur), and then sum all of
the grants given to an executive in a specific year. This yields a variable (numnewop)
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Execucomp provides a variable (soptgrnt) which gives the number of options granted in
each year but the values provided are not always the same as those obtained when
summing across all grants for an executive. Using the ‘bottom-up’ approach is more
internally consistent with the rest of the estimation of grant value and therefore it is the
one which I employ.
The intrinsic value of new options granted in a year is calculated as:

ivnew = max(0, (prccf - expric)) * numsecur = max(0, S - K) * numsecur
The intrinsic values of exercisable and unexercisable options are calculated in a similar
manner. First, I need to determine an estimate of the average strike price, since this
information is not directly available from Execucomp. For unexercisable options, the
average strike price is assumed to be:
prccf −

inmonun − ivnew
uexnumun − numnewop

Inmonun is the intrinsic value of the unexercisable options held at the end of the

year, some of which are from new option grants, as reported to Execucomp. Uexnumun is
the reported number of such options.
Although most option grants are unexercisable, there are some circumstances
where numnewop > uexnumum – the number of newly granted options exceeds the
intrinsic year-end value of the unexercisable options. In this case, wealth is calculated
assuming that some of the options are exercisable. The strike price for exercisable options
is calculated as:
K new =

inmonex
uexnumex − (numnewop − uexnumun)
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new grants. Inmonex is the reported intrinsic value of exercisable options held at year
end and uexnumex is the number of these options.
There are several specific cases for exercisable options which are dealt with
particularly. To handle outliers the maximum value of an option is recoded to be the yearend value of the stock price – an option cannot be worth more than the underlying asset.
There are also a number of cases where the number of newly granted options exceeds the
number of total options at year end, i.e. numnewop > uexnumun + uexnumex. In these
cases I assume that the options held at year end are entirely new grants and there were no
previously granted options. There are also some cases where some of the newly granted
options appear to be exercisable options with intrinsic value. These are identified when
ivnew > inmonun and numnewop > uexnumun. For these values, the strike price of the

exercisable options is calculated as
K new = prccf −

inmonex − (ivnew − inmonun)
uexnumex − (numnewop − uexnumun)

Given these estimates of the strike prices and maturities of the outstanding option
portfolios, it is possible to calculate the delta for total new grants, unexercisable options
held and exercisable options held. These are then combined with the shares owned by the
executive to give the formula for total delta:

1 × shrown + delta _ new + max(0, uexnumun − numnewop ) × delta _ unex 
Delta = 

+ max(0, (unexnumex − max(0, numnewop − uexnumun))) × delta _ exer 
Where the deltas are calculated according to the formula given above.
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Vega is the sensitivity of CEO wealth to a change in the volatility of the
underlying stock, specifically to a .01 change in the annualized stock return volatility.
Vega increases the convexity of the rewards to executives, and this convexity creates
incentives for executives to take on more risk. The level of vega is generally determined
by several structural factors, some of which are easily manipulable by the granting boards
and others not. These include the time-to-maturity of the option, the dividend yield, the
historic volatility of the company, the ratio of the current stock price to strike price, and
the risk-free rate. The first-order effects are expected to be due to stock price relative to
the exercise price and time to maturity.
Capital structure theories of reinsurance purchase, as shown in Garven and Lamm
Tennant (2003), predict that a higher vega should lead to less reinsurance purchased and
more risk retained by the firm. Although Guay (1999) notes that the net effect of vega
depends on the power of the payoff convexity to overcome the concavity of the
managerial utility function, the convexity appears to override the concavity of the utility
function in all empirical studies.
This has been shown empirically as Guay (1999) mentions “stock return volatility
is positively related to the convexity provided to managers, suggesting convex incentive
schemes influence investing and finance decisions.” Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000), and
Guay (1999) have shown a positive association between vega and stock return volatility
and leverage using vega on the right-hand-side. When vega is the dependent variable
there exists a positive correlation between vega and firm size, investment opportunities,
and research and development expenditure (Guay, 1999).
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and the same assumptions described above in the creation of delta are used for numbers
of options, strike price and time to maturity. Guay (1999) shows that option vega is many
times higher than stock vega, allowing for the assumption that the vega of restricted stock
is zero. The calculated vegas are summed across each of the categories of new grants,
exercisable and unexercisable options to create the total vega. Vega for each is calculated
according to the formula:
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Again, compared with Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) who reported a mean value of
80 and median of 46, the numbers are slightly higher. The average vega for an insurance
CEO is 114, with a median value of 48. As with delta, a t-test confirms that CEOs have
vegas which are significantly higher than other managers at a company. The fact that the
means are so much higher than the medians shows that a few CEOs have contracts with
significantly more incentive pay than the industry average and there is a long right tail in
the pay distribution. Vega has increased over time, as shown in figure 2. As with delta, I
examine the within-firm variance in vega by examining the residuals after a fixed effect
regression controlled with firm and year dummies. The within-firm standard deviation of
the residuals is found to be about $97,000, about half of the value before controlling for
fixed effects. While firms obviously differ in their use of executive incentives, firms have
enough heterogeneity over time to provide meaningful results on the effect of a policy
change.
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Figure 2
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3.4 Other Insurance Company Variables
The control variables used in the regressions can be broadly separated into three
categories: those related to structural reasons for managing risk, those related to the
executive’s personal reasons for managing risk, and those which help address the issue of
endogeneity in the equations. The structural variables are measures of the size of the firm,
firm performance, risk-management skill, the riskiness of insurance claim losses, the
riskiness of investment returns, the riskiness of revenue, the riskiness of insurance
reserves, the average tax rate paid by the firm, the diversification of group business by
line and geography, the diversification of the group’s ownership, the standard deviation
of stock returns, and the A.M. Best rating of the group. The managerial control variables
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company and as Chief Executive Officer. These are expected to be positively associated
with reinsurance purchase. In the final group of control variables, which are sometimes
included in panel regressions, are the predicted values of delta and vega given the other
observables of the firm as well as the residuals. Twice-lagged values (t-2) are also
included in some specifications to control for prior firm policy.
The size of the firm is likely to affect both the demand for reinsurance and the
amount of compensation paid to the manager. Consistent with prior literature, firm size is
defined as the logarithm of admitted assets and is positively related to risk retained, as
shown in table 2. The size of the firm likely affects reinsurance demand through expected
bankruptcy costs and tax burden, investment incentives, real-service efficiencies and
economies of scale, since larger firms likely need to purchase proportionally less
reinsurance to take advantage of a greater risk pool and may also experience some
economies of scale in hedging (Fok, Carroll and Chiou (1997), Powell and Sommer
(2007)). Additionally, expected bankruptcy costs are less than proportional to firm size,
(Fok, Carroll and Chiu (1997), Warner (1977) Altman (1984)) so larger firms will have
less probability of bankruptcy and gain less from reducing the effects of bankruptcy,
giving them less reason to hedge. Mayers and Smith (1990), Powell and Sommer (2007)
and Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003) find evidence of this effect.
Most insurance companies do not break even or make the majority of their profits
on the premiums they charge, demonstrated by an average combined ratio of above 100
in the data. Companies rely on investment earnings for profitability, taking advantage of
both their investment skill and the time-lag between premium payments and loss
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with their losses and therefore provide a natural hedge. Rho is calculated from the losses
by line and return by investment category for each observed year and line for a group,
weighted by the proportion of investments and premiums. Rho is a measure of the overall
risk of the portfolio of business that a company conducts, similar to that computed for
assigning surplus in Myers and Read (2001). This measure accounts for the variances and
covariances between the liability lines and assets of the firm. Rho is not strongly related
to firm-observable results, although it is related to the incentives given to executives.
The primary risk to an insurer is from claims due to losses and their variance may
be very different depending on line and type of business written. The volatility of losses
is calculated from a group’s observed loss history. I find that the riskiness of each
company’s business has an insignificant effect on its demand for reinsurance.
Earnings risk is calculated from the variance in investment and premium earnings.
A low volatility in investment earnings reduces the risk that a company will have to cover
losses out of its surplus and a company should attempt to offset high volatility by
purchasing more reinsurance. Alternately, if the higher deviation of investment returns
reflects a preference of the management for more risky activities, the risky investment
decisions could imply less reinsurance. The net effect is theoretically uncertain, and I find
that historical volatility in a group’s reported investment earning is related to more risk
retention at the company, but not group, level. I use these variances in the comparison
regressions where I attempt to see how similar my data set is to other studies in the field.
In my own regressions I use the portion of a company’s investments in stock and bonds
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study. This measure is obtained from the A.M. Best database.
The other portion of earnings volatility comes from the direct business written by
a company. A large change in premium volatility could represent a company that is
rapidly changing, either growing or shrinking in size or one that is entering a new line of
business. While the loss volatility can measure that danger that a company is exposed to
an unexpected loss, the historical premium volatility measures the steadiness of a group’s
business model and can be compared to a group’s ‘tenure’ in a given industry. Fok,
Carroll and Chiou (1997) note that firm’s with more volatile operating income are more
likely to hedge in order to reduce their business risk. I find mixed results, occasionally
showing an insignificant relation between risk retained and premium volatility and
occasionally a positive and significant one. These three volatility variables are constant
over years for included firms, due to the method of their construction, so the variables are
excluded from the fixed-effects regressions.
The average tax rate that a firm pays may provide incentives to purchase
reinsurance because decreasing the proportion of assets in taxable investments provides
valuable tax shields, but also increases the probability of insolvency as the firm becomes
more levered. Simultaneously, since tax-favored assets likely yield lower returns than
taxable ones, the firm lowers its potential investment returns and it therefore faces greater
risk of paying out of its reserves. Because of these two effects, a firm should retain more
risk if it pays a higher tax rate and purchase more reinsurance as its proportion of taxfavored assets increases. A firm’s average tax rate is calculated from the average tax paid
on investments and a higher tax rate is associated with more risk retained. Tax rates may
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observed in the data set.
By diversifying across several lines of business a company can help to protect
itself from large, idiosyncratic shocks and avoid bankruptcy costs. The business
concentration of an insurance company is measured by its herfindahl index across its
lines of business which measures the exposure to a given line. The net effect of business
concentration is ambiguous as there are several ways in which concentration can affect
reinsurance demand. Real-service efficiencies have a direct effect as the less concentrated
an insurer’s business is, the more valuable the rating function of the reinsurer will be
(Mayers and Smith, 1990). Diversification may act as a substitute for reinsurance, leading
to less demand. However, a company could specialize in a low-volatility line of business
which would decrease its demand for reinsurance or choose less risky insureds within
those lines (Powell and Sommer, 2007). I do not find any evidence that companies target
their risk-retention on specific lines of business. The herfindahl index is calculated by the
direct premiums written in each line for a group and is found to be positively associated
with risk retention, implying that the diversification effect is more pronounced than the
possibility of specializing in low-volatility lines.
Group concentration measures to what extent an insurance group is split between
different companies. A group with many large companies would be quite diverse while a
company which has only one large lead company and a few smaller subsidiaries would be
less diverse. The diversity of a group is likely to play a role in reinsurance demand
because of the diversification effect that limited liability grants to insurance companies,
which may limit bankruptcy costs. If a subsidiary suffers excessive losses, the lead
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insurance group from the shock. This is desirable as owning a portfolio of options is
worth more to an investor than owning an option on a portfolio. The group concentration
Herfindahl is constructed by aggregating the direct premiums written for each company
within an insurance group. I do not find a significant relationship between group
diversification and reinsurance purchase.
Diversification effects also affect risk management through geographic
diversification. The most basic measurement technique is simply to use the number of
states in which a firm is licensed to sell insurance. This is the technique used in Mayers
and Smith (1990) and Garven and Lamm Tennant (2003). The valid regions for business
include the 50 states, the District of Columbia and four territories. The maximum number
of geographic regions is 55.
Mayers and Smith (1990) identify three ways in which geographic concentration
can affect demand for reinsurance. 1) By increasing the volatility of taxable income, the
tax savings through reinsurance are increased. 2) The volatility of the value of the firm is
increased and so the expected bankruptcy costs and investment incentives for reinsurance
are increased. 3) The value of real services provided by the insurer is increased with
specialization and therefore the demand for reinsurance should decline. The net effect is
therefore ambiguous, as the tax, bankruptcy, and investment incentives effects imply
increased demand while the real-service efficiencies argument implies less demand.
A more-diversified firm is also less likely to be exposed to catastrophic losses
(Powell and Sommer, 2007), because this effect is likely to be more important in some
lines than others this is unlikely to be a major causal variable for most insurance
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captures the effect of a large firm which is located within only one state versus a large
firm which is spread over many states. I find little actual effect for geographic
diversification among insurance groups. The states-licensed variable is negative and
significant when examining at the company-level but not at the group level. The
geographic herfindahl index, which measures diversification of premiums written by state
is significantly negative for both companies and groups.
The A.M. Best rating describes the default probability for an insurance firm. This
default risk affects reinsurance demand through the bankruptcy cost and investment
incentive channels. Both channels imply that a riskier firm should purchase more
reinsurance, although I find no significant effect. For groups, the A.M. Best rating of the
largest corporation in the group in a given year is used.
To account for supply effects in the insurance market within a given year and
market performance, yearly dummy variables are included. This study covers both
periods of hard and soft-markets in the insurance industry. There are many years with
significant negative effects, controlling, for example for the pricing shocks on
reinsurance after the terrorist attacks in 2001. It is particularly necessary to account for
year-by-year differences because of the long time series used in this study. The base year
(t=1) is 1992.
Firm performance is measured by the total return to shareholders, obtained from
COMPUSTAT. As in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) it is included as a control
variable to capture the general quality of a company’s business and the environment it is
operating in. This measure of firm performance is included because it is the one which is
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bring the interests of management in line with those of shareholders, then the focus of
management should be on increasing this return, the one which would benefit the
managers-as-owners the most. These returns vary from -73% to +121% in the short-term
1-year data. A drawback to this measure is that it is affected by noise and general market
trends – and thus may not give an entirely clear picture of the actions of management.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) note that monitoring of managers is more difficult in markets
with more variance or returns and more noise. The more noise there is, the greater the
cost of obtaining information on managerial performance and the less information which
is available. Also, if managers are behaving optimally, then there is relatively more noise
to information on managerial performance – the random effects of the market have a
greater effect if managers have already maximized firm value as much as they are able to
through their decisions.
I use growth in premiums as a control to measure the business environment of the
firm and its need for proper risk management. A firm can grow quickly by taking on
more business but may also find it more difficult to assess the risk. Generally, a new
account will have more unknowns than a long-established one and the company may not
yet have expertise in pricing idiosyncratic properties. Thus a large growth in premiums
may generate demand for safer risk-decisions. If firms are drawing in more customers
because they are viewed as able to better assess risk and offer a fairer price or because
they are better managed than their competitors then a growth in premiums represents a
gain in firm value. However, if an increase in premiums is due to the firm taking on
customers which they otherwise would not have - worse market risks – then an increase
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calculated as the change in direct premiums written as reported to the NAIC by each
company. Total premiums written for each year are calculated by summing across all of
the companies owned by each insurance group.
The loss ratio measures how risky an insurer’s book of business is. It is calculated
by dividing losses and loss adjustments expenses by premiums earned. This control
variable gives a broad measure as to how good of a job a company does at assessing risk
and charging proper premiums. The loss ratio shows what percentage of payouts are
being settled with recipients. The lower the loss ratio the better – a firm with a low loss
ratio appears to be good at assessing its business risk and may be ale to make riskier
decisions when concerning bankruptcy risk. Higher loss ratios may indicate that an
insurance company may need better risk management policies to guard against future
possible insurance payouts. A high ratio may also occur because of an idiosyncratic
shock which results in an abnormally high number of claims. If this is an industry-wide
effect however, then the use of year dummies should control for this potential source of
error.

3.5 Executive Demographic Variables
The chief executive at each company was determined mainly by the Execucomp
CEO flag which I corrected according to the date on when an executive became CEO. If
a company switched CEOs midyear both executives were flagged as being the CEO for
that year. If no executive was listed for a company, then the highest-paid executive was
identified as the CEO. In 23 cases two executives were listed as CEO for a given
company in the same year. In these cases the one who held the office at the end of the
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when the variables were recorded. This allows the panel to be identified by firms in a
given year, rather than by executives.
I examined the employment horizon of each executive by using the age of the
executive. Employment horizon may particularly play a role as the executive nears
retirement and wants to secure any promised retirement package. As this date draws
closer, the executive will likely be willing to retain less risk to ensure he maintains his
position and the company remains in business. Tufano (1996) notes that in this context
managerial age may serve as a proxy for risk aversion, although he does not find
significant results.
The length of time which an executive has served as CEO may play an important
role for several reasons. If the executive is more familiar with the business then he may
be able to better the firm’s productivity. However if tenure is a proxy for managerial
power over the board of directors then the executive may direct his power towards
activities that enrich him personally but do not create firm value. Fok, Carroll, and Chiou
(1997) find a negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and corporate
hedging, implying that firms where managers are more entrenched are more likely to bear
risk, which they explain as evidence of perk consumption: entrenched managers are still
not acting in shareholder’s interests by not hedging. Chakraborty, Sheikh, and
Subramanian (2007) provide evidence that managers who face high termination risk are
more likely to make low-volatility investments than those who do not face such risk of
losing their jobs. This implies that entrenched managers would make more risky
investments than those who are less entrenched. I constructed this variable using the year
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data set.
The length of time a CEO has spent at his company may be another measure of
how entrenched he his and how well he performs at the business, separate from his role
as CEO. This is strictly a measure of an executive’s length of association with a company
and may be longer, in some cases much longer, than the tenure as CEO. A manager who
is well entrenched is more likely to desire to maintain his position and purchases more
reinsurance. Tufano (1996) notes that a manager with less tenure may be more likely to
engage in risk management practices and finds evidence of this result. However, since
reinsurance is well-known in the insurance industry, this sort of effect is less prevalent
here. It may also be a measure of how well he knows the business of the company and
therefore the size of the real-service efficiencies the company is able to provide, which
would lead to less reinsurance purchase. These effects go in opposite directions so the net
effect of tenure needs to be determined empirically.
I created missing dummies to control for missing observations without reducing
the sample size. These dummy variables allow observations to be included in the analysis
while still recognizing that they are different from observations for which we have
complete information. The missing dummy is coded as one if the observation was
missing and zero otherwise. After the dummy is created the initial observation is recoded
as zero and included in the regression. This has the effect of counting the observation as
the mean value of the variable and leaves an OLS regression unbiased. Missing dummy
variables were created for age, tenure as CEO, tenure at company, stock returns, loss
ratio, proportion of risky investments, and growth in premiums.
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4. Empirical Setup
This section covers the empirical methodology used in this study. First, I describe
the panel least-squares and instrumental variable regressions used to investigate the
relationship between executive incentives and risk-management decisions, along with the
regressions to create predicted variables. Then I identify the systems of simultaneous
equations used for investigating the possibility that many of the variables are codetermined. Section six explains robustness checks, along with their results.

4.1 Incentives and Risk Management
4.1.1 Panel Regressions
I am ultimately interested in determining the effect that delta and vega have on the
risk decision variables. With the panel data I have, the most general empirical
specification is the fixed-effects regression:
Equation 2

Ri ,t = β 1υ i ,t −1 + β 3δ i ,t −1 + Yt + η i + ε i ,t
which simply examines the effect on the risk decision, observed at the end of year t of the
managerial incentives in effect at the beginning of year t. An individual insurer group is
denoted by i. This fixed effects regressions also controls for unobservable firm effects
which are constant over time – such as preferences of ingrained habits on risk policy or a
history of conducting certain business – and potentially correlated with other independent
variables in the regression. This regression is presented in column 1 of tables 6-9. It is
then expanded by adding the control variables discussed in section 3, which yields
equation 3, displayed in column 2 of those same tables:
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Equation 3:

Ri , t = β1 X i , t + β 2υi ,t −1 + β 3δ i ,t −1 + β 4Ci , t + Yt + ηi + ε i , t
I run this equation for each of the risk-decision variables, represented by R: riskretained, proportion of business in schedule P lines, the Premium/Surplus ratio and the
A.M. Best Capital Adequacy ratio. X represents the control variables determined by prior
literature to affect reinsurance purchase and described in section 3. The structural
controls are the size of the firm, the premium-surplus ratio, the correlation between
investment returns and claims, the average tax rate paid by the firm, the diversification of
group business by line and geography, the diversification of the group’s ownership,
growth in premiums, loss ratio, proportion of assets in stocks and bonds, shareholder
return and the A.M. Best rating of the group. Managerial control variables include the age
of the executive, as well as his tenure as a chief executive and at a particular company, as
well as missing dummies to control for missing variables. The executive’s incentives are
given by δ (delta) and υ (vega), whereas the cash value of a compensation package is
represented by C, which I use to help control for managerial risk aversion. Y are the year
dummies for each year in the study, except the first year, 1992. η represents fixed effects
for a specific company, and ε is a idiosyncratic error for each individual at each time.
I assume that target values for the risk-decision are set by the executive and
adjusted throughout the year, according to market conditions, so I include
contemporaneous values of the control variables. Cash compensation is assumed to be
guaranteed, so the contemporaneous value is used. Because incentive variables are
calculated using year-end figures, the current year incentives known to the chief
executive are those which exist at the and of the previous year. Thus, lagged values of
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the risk-decision and incentive variables is investigated using a system of simultaneous
equations, described below.
By using fixed-effects regressions on panel data, I am able to control for firm and
executive specific idiosyncrasies that may be persistent over time. Employing the fixedeffect regressions has a similar effect to de-meaning the data to account for unobserved
variables which are constant over time, but vary between firms – the error structure
which best describes unobserved variables due to risk policy preferences or a history of
conducting particular business. It is likely that some executives internally prefer more
risk than others for reasons that are not directly observable. Similarly, some firms may
have a culture of bearing more risk than others. The fixed-effects specifications accounts
for the fact that these preferences may be correlated with observed variables. Industrywide effects that occur in only a single year are controlled for using the year dummies,
allowing me to concentrate on individual observation fixed-effects.
The fixed-effect regressions are then expanded as:
Equation 4:

)
)
Ri ,t = β1 X i ,t + β 2Ci ,t + β 3υi ,t −1 + β 4δ i ,t −1 + Yt + ηi + ε i ,t
and
Equation 5

)
)
)
)
Ri ,t = β 1 X i ,t + β 2 C i ,t + β 3υ i ,t −1 + β 4δ i ,t −1 + β 5υ i ,t −1,resid + β 6δ i ,t −1,resid + Yt + η i + ε i ,t
which incorporate the predicted lagged values of delta and vega as well as the residuals in
equation 5, denoted by hats: ^.
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natural or desired level of vega and deviations form it. This allows me to examine if
^

variation in incentives from past policy and structural preference, represented by υ and
^

δ , or the predicted values of vega and delta affect risk bearing. Deviations from this
value are given by the residuals in the equations, which capture the effect of the portion
of incentives which are orthogonal to all of the other control variables. Thus, it is possible
to investigate how much of the risk decision is due to what would be natural for the firm
and how much is due to variations in the incentives given to management. The predicted
values are determined by the regressions:
Equation 6:

)

)

υi , t = β1 X i , t + Yt + υi , t , resid
and
Equation 7:

)

)

δ i ,t = β 1 X i ,t + Yt + δ i ,t , resid

where X represents the current managerial and structural control variables as explained
before. The control variables are contemporaneous with the vales of delta and vega, one
year before the control variables used in equation 4, which are contemporaneous with the
risk decision. Y is a control variable for all of the years appearing in the study. These
expressions yield what the industry-standard value of delta or vega would be, given the
particular observable details of a firm, and results are presented in table 4. By controlling
for this, I can compensate for whether expected values of incentives have effects on risk
decisions. In addition, in equation 5, the coefficients on residual delta and vega can
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behavior by differing from the ‘expected’ incentives.
I also examine the role of managerial power on risk decisions in some of the
specifications. Managers who are more entrenched in their firm are likely better able to
dictate the terms of their contract to extract more compensation from a willing board and
should also be positioned to make safer risk-decisions to protect their position. To test
this I predict how much an executive should be paid given the structure of an insurance
firm and the demographics of the executive. The difference between this predicted value
and the actual level of pay could be considered a proxy of the power of the manager. This
relationship is estimated using the following equation:
Equation 8

Payi = α + β1 X i + ε i
Pay is measured using Compustat’s TDC1 variable which measures the pay
granted to the executive by the board. X is the entire set of firm structural and managerial
characteristic variables described previously. The residual, PayResid, is then calculated
using the predicted coefficients. This regression is also presented in table 4, described in
section 5.

4.1.2 Instrumental Variable Regressions
I attempt to resolve the problem of potential endogeneity due to simultaneous
determination of the risk and compensation structure choices by conducting several
instrumental variable regressions with a form similar to that of the panel regressions.
Four different specifications are presented below. The first, in column 5 of tables 6-9,
includes only the incentives with the twice-lagged value of vega used to instrument the
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twice-lagged predicted value of vega to instrument lagged vega. It is possible that the
incentive variables at the beginning of a year are correlated with the idiosyncratic error in
the risk-decision regression for that year. However, it is less likely that the incentives
from two years ago are associated with this error, making the twice-lagged variables a
potential instrument. There is consistency in incentive variables over time. The
correlation coefficient between vega at t and t-1 is 0.84, while that for delta is 0.96. I also
use the t-2 predicted values as an instrument in column 7 to attempt to capture the effects
of firm policies and make the instrumental variable regressions as directly comparable to
the least-squares fixed-effect panel regressions as possible. All instrumental regressions
are run taking into account panel fixed effects. Because these instrumental variable
regressions control for potential endogeneity better than the panel regressions and these
best fit the likely story of managerial incentives, the results in column 6, using twicelagged values of vega and control variables are the preferred results in this paper. The
correlation matrix among all main variables in this study is given in appendix 3.

4.1.3 Simultaneous Equations
It is likely that the level of risk that the firm bears, or the level that is preferred by
boards of directors, is determined at the same time as the pay package offered to the
CEO. If directors are using incentives to attempt to alter risk policy in a systematic way
then delta and vega should be related to the risk decisions. If they are unrelated then this
could mean that boards are no looking at current policy when setting compensation or
that compensation is already set optimally. I examine this situation for the risk-retention
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table 9.
Equation 9

Rit = α1 + β1υi ,t + β 2δ i ,t + β 3 Payresidi ,t + β 4Ci , t + β 5CEOi ,t + β 6trsi ,t + β 7GPWi ,t + β8taxi ,t

β 9 numSi , t + β10 Howni , t + β11Yrs + ε i ,t , R
υi , t = α 2 + λ1Ri ,t + λ2δ i ,t + λ3υi ,t −1 + λ4Ci , t + λ5 firmrisk + λ6CEOi ,t + λ7 X i , t + λ8 schedPi ,t
+ λ9Yrs + ε i ,t ,υ

δ i ,t = α 3 + γ 1Ri , t + γ 2υi , t + γ 3δ i ,t −1 + γ 4 firmrisk + γ 5CEOi ,t + γ 6 X i , t + γ 7 schedPi ,t
+ γ 8Yrs + ε i ,t ,δ
here, contemporaneous variables are used, in accordance with the assumptions of
simultaneous equations. The measures of risk decisions are included in the incentive
equations. Previously used variables are as described before. payresid is the residual of
predicted pay level. trs is the total return to shareholders. firmrisk is the standard
deviation of stock returns, which measures the ‘noise’ of the market that the firm is
operating in and the potential usefulness of incentive pay. GPW is the growth in
premiums written, schedP is the proportion of firm business which takes place in longtailed lines. Variables are included according to prior simultaneous equations literature
which examines incentives and the risk-management decision. Schedule P, or long-tailed
lines are included as part of the identification restrictions for the incentive equations,
because this is another choice through which incentives could affect firm risk decisions –
I examine the co-determination of business in long-tailed lines and incentives variables
next.
A similar set of equations is estimated for the amount of business in schedule P
lines described in equation 10.
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Equation 10

schedPi , t = α1 + β1υi , t + β 2δ i , t + β 3 Payresidi , t + β 4Ci , t + β 5CEOi , t + β 6trsi , t + β 7GPWi , t
+ β8taxi , t + β 9 numSi , t + β10 Howni , t + β11Yrs + ε i , t

υi , t = α 2 + λ1schedPi , t + λ2δ i , t + λ3υi , t −1 + λ4Ci , t + λ5 firmrisk + λ6CEOi , t + λ7 X i , t + λ8 Ri , t
+ λ9Yrs + ε i , t

δ i , t = α 3 + γ 1schedPi , t + γ 2υi , t + γ 3δ i , t −1 + γ 4 firmrisk + γ 5CEOi , t + γ 6 X i , t + γ 7 Ri , t + γ 8Yrs + ε i , t
Each of the control variables is defined as above, but here the risk-retention
decision is included to help identify the incentive equations, along with lagged incentive
values, because this is an alternate decision that could be made by managers to increase
or reduce risk.
Next, each measure of leverage: the Premium/Surplus ratio and Best’s Capital
Adequacy Ratio, is estimated using a similar system, described in equation 11.
Equation 11

Levi , t = α1 + β1υi , t + β 2δ i , t + β 3 Payresidi , t + β 4Ci , t + β 5CEOi , t + β 6trsi , t + β 7GPWi , t + β8taxi , t

β 9 numSi , t + β10 Howni , t + β11Ri , t + β12Yrs + ε i , t
υi , t = α 2 + λ1schedPi , t + λ2δ i , t + λ3υi , t −1 + λ4Ci , t + λ5 firmrisk + λ6CEOi , t + λ7 X i , t + λ8 Ri , t
+ λ9Yrs + ε i , t

δ i , t = α 3 + γ 1schedPi , t + γ 2υi , t + γ 3δ i , t −1 + γ 4 firmrisk + γ 5CEOi , t + γ 6 X i , t + γ 7 Ri , t + γ 8Yrs + ε i , t
This system is much the same as the two before, however the leverage decision is
now assumed to be made while incentives are set, taking into account the firm’s business
and risk-retention decision, in a manner similar to Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006).

4.2 Relationship with Stock Return Variance
For executives to consider incentives when determining firm decisions, it is
necessary that those decisions should have an effect on the stock variance – the
underlying measure upon which the incentives are based. To see if the risk decision
variables are actually related to the risk of the firm which affects vega, I regress each
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each variable may take some time to take effect, I include both contemporaneous and
lagged values of each of the risk variables in the right-hand-side of the equations, along
with the standard variables which should affect the risk of firm returns.
Equation 12

ln sdretsi = RRi , t + RRi , t −1 + RRi ,t − 2 + X i + Yt + a + ei

In these standard OLS regressions, X, is the observable set of control variables
which is included to compensate for other factors which investors may take into account
when determining firm value and the benefit of firm decisions. Y is the set of year
dummies which account for returns in any specific year, while e is the idiosyncratic error
and a is a constant term. This equation is estimated both with and without the twicelagged term and results are given in table 14.

5. Empirical Results
5.1 Creation of Predicted Variables
For the panel and instrumental variable regressions, predicted values of
managerial pay, risk retention, delta, and vega were created as described in section 4. The
results are presented in Table 4. Several of the control variables were found to be
important in determining the level of these variables.
The residual of managerial pay is used as a proxy measure for the manager’s clout
within the firm’s management structure. As is consistent with the literature, larger firms
pay more and managers who have been CEO longer receive more pay. After his has been
controlled for, older executives receive less pay than expected. Several of the year
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executive talent over time. This regression broadly confirms the usual results from the
managerial pay literature.
Delta is related to the length of time an executive has worked – how long they
have had to build up a portfolio of options and stock. Both length of tenure as CEO and
tenure at the company are positive and significant as CEOs are usually awarded more
options per year than other managers. All of the firm variables are insignificant. In
contrast, some of the firm-structure variables do seem to be important when determining
the executive’s vega. The tenure variables are still significant, and tenure at company has
a negative effect. Executives at larger firms also have higher sensitivities of wealth to
stock variance. Executives at firms with concentrated business have higher sensitivities
while those at firms whose business is uncorrelated with losses – those which do not have
as much of a natural hedge – have lower sensitivies. Executives at better-rated firms also
have higher sensitivities to firm stock-price variance.
As shown in the comparison regressions discussed in section 4, many of the
structural variables have an effect on a group’s risk retention. Older CEOs tend to take
riskier actions while those who have been a CEO for longer, and are presumably more
entrenched, take less risky actions. As expected, larger firms bear more risk. Finally,
groups with worse AM Best ratings are also those who bear more risk, suggesting that the
company penalizes firms for excessive risk-bearing.
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5.2 Panel and IV Regressions
Panel and instrumental variable regressions are the preferred specifications in this
paper and are presented in tables 6-9, all of which share the same basic structure. Table 5
provides summary results from the preferred regressions in this study. Delta is found to
be associated with less-risky decisions while the results from vega are mixed. The only
result significant at the 10% level is that a higher vega is associated with less business in
long-tailed lines. The regression results are explained in the particular subsections below.
In each table, least-squares panel regressions are shown in section A (Columns 1-4) and
the instrumental variable regressions are shown in section B (Columns 5-7). The equation
in column 1 only the incentive variables are regressed on the risk decision variable.
Column 2 adds control variables to examine the relative importance of managerial
incentives. Column 3 uses predicted values of delta and vega to analyze the general effect
of expected firm policy and correct for endogeneity. Column 4 includes residuals for
delta and vega to determine the effect of the part of the sensitivity which is orthogonal to
its predictor control variables – deviations from expected policy. The instrumental
variables follow similar specifications using twice-lagged values of the sensitivity
variables as instruments for the once-lagged variables included in the normal
specification. Column 6 performs this same regression with control variables. Columns 7
uses the twice-lagged predicted values as an instrument.
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Risk Measure

Delta

Vega

Risk Retained

0.14

8.402

-1.357

-24.303*

-19.535

153.145

-5.277

-74.703

Proportion of Business in
Long-Tailed Lines
Premium/Surplus Ratio
Best’s Capital Adequacy
Ratio
* indicates significane at the 10% level. Risk measure and incentives are described in
section 4.

5.2.1 Risk Retained
The fixed-effects regressions on risk retained reveal a role for executive
incentives in determining risk policy. The sign on delta is negative and insignificant in
the first four specifications. However, the delta residuals are significant, indicating that
an increase in delta from expected values is correlated with more risk-bearing. Vega is
positive and significant in column one, as expected. When control variables are included,
the coefficient is still positive, but no longer significant. The coefficient on predicted
Vega is positive and significant in both of the specifications, although residuals appear to
have no effect. These results indicate that increasing an executive’s wealth sensitivity to
volatility at the beginning of a year does in fact encourage companies to purchase less
reinsurance throughout the ensuing business year.
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insignificant. Older CEOs, a natural hedge, and firm business concentration all are
associated with more risk retention in the incentives and control equation. In the
predicted and residuals equation groups which are more concentrated retain more risk.
Again, these firms appear to be taking on more risky policies, rather than using
reinsurance as a way to reduce risk.
The instrumental variable regressions show that the incentives have the proper
sign, although they are not significant. Further, delta is positive when lagged predicted
values are used as instruments rather than actual values. Firm structure variables appear
to be more significant in these regressions. Cash compensation is positively associated
with risk retention, which is unexpected. As in the panel regressions older CEOs keep on
more risk. More natural hedging, provided by a higher correlation of claims and losses,
leads to more risk retention, as expected. More concentrated firms appear to retain more
risk, which indicates general risk-bearing preferences.
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5.2.2 Proportion of Business in Long-Tailed Lines
There is evidence that executives are responding to incentives on the decision of
how much business to conduct in risky lines, although their actions are the opposite of
what would be expected. Incentives are insignificant in columns 1 and 2. When predicted
values are used then delta is positive, indicating that executives are taking on business
that they might otherwise have passed by, but predicted vega is negative and significant
and remains so when residuals are included. This result implies that executives are
actually taking on less risky business when they are given incentives to take on risk – a
counterintuitive result. This same result occurs in columns 6 and 7 of the instrumental
variable regressions. While delta has a negative effect in the instrumental variable
regressions using predicted variables.
Again, several of the firm and structural variables are significant. Lower
correlations between investment returns and claims costs are associated with more longtailed line business – these Schedule P lines do seem to add more risk to the company’s
profile and do not provide a natural hedge. Firms which are more diversified in their
business conduct less business in long-tailed lines, as we would expect. These risky lines
seem to be the business of some specialty firms as other results suggest. Instrumental
variables suggest that companies which are more concentrated in their group ownership
conduct more of this risky business, which is what would be expected if these lines are
the specialty of a few companies. Instrumental variable results, as well as those from
panel regressions using predicted values indicate that companies which are less
geographically diversified also conduct more business in these risky lines. CEOs who
have been in their position longer appear to conduct more business in these risky lines.
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opposite result. The only significant results for tenure at a particular company come from
using predicted values and indicate that executives who have longer tenure appear to
conduct less business in these lines. CEOs who are brought in from outside may be more
willing to expand into this business or may have specialized skills or preferences which
leads them to pursue these lines.

Jeremy Skog

- 67 -

Jeremy Skog

- 68 -

Jeremy Skog
- 69 5.2.3 Leverage: Premium/Surplus Ratio
Executives do not appear to be responding to incentives when determining
leverage, at least as measured by the premium/surplus ratio. Both the delta and vega
coefficients are negative, though insignificant, in the panel regression. The predicted
values of vega are both positive, but again, insignificant. The residual of delta has a
negative effect on leverage and is significant at the 10% level. The coefficient values for
the instrumental variable regressions go in the expected direction, but these values are not
statistically significant.
Some of the structural control variables do appear to be positively related to the
leverage of the firm. The loss ratio is uniformly positive and significant – firms which
take on more business appear to experience greater losses relative to the premiums they
earn. It is possible that this is because they are taking on riskier business that they might
otherwise pass over, rather than recruiting new business with the same risk profile. The
number of states in which a firm does business is also uniformly related to more
premiums for a given level of surplus. Perhaps state-level subsidiaries provide
bankruptcy protection which offsets the affect of increased leverage for the group as a
whole. When considering incentive and control variables firms which are more
specialized in their business are also more leveraged – considering that firms which are
more specialized also retain more risk then it is possible that these firms are making
riskier decisions when they specialize in a particular line of business. I investigate
whether firms are specializing in particularly risky lines of business in 5.2.2 and also in
the robustness checks section of this paper. A higher tax rate is associated with less
leverage as is more investment in risky assets. This is evidnce that firms who write more
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these extra premiums to attempt to earn higher yields on their invested assets.
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Another leverage decision faced by the firm is that of setting policies to determine
Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio. There is little evidence that incentive variables play a role
in this decision, as none of the incentive variables are significant. Furthermore, in all of
the regressions except for the incentives-only fixed effects regression, vega has a
negative coefficient. These signs are the same for delta. The residual for delta is positive
and significant at the 5% level, the only significant incentive result. Best’s Capital
Adequacy Ratio does not seem to be a major target of managers.
Only a few structural variables are significant. As is expected, firms with a better
AM best rating have a better, higher ratio. Interestingly, firms with more concentrated
ownership also have a better adequacy ratio. Firms with more investments in stocks and
bonds have higher ratios.
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5.3 Simultaneous Equation Regressions
The relationship between incentives and firm decisions was also investigated in a
simultaneous-equations framework to test the possibility that the contemporaneous levels
of delta and vega were made at the same time as the firm’s risk decision. Because grants
of options are made throughout the year and firms continually adjust their business
decisions, treating these variables as uncorrelated and static may not capture their true
structure. Simultaneous equations adjust the error structure of the regressions to account
for this possible co-determination. I first examine the firm’s reinsurance purchase
decision and its business in risky lines. Then, taking these decisions into account, I
examine the firm’s leverage decision. The results are presented in tables 10-13. Each
table has a similar structure, adjusted for the specifications of each regression. The
endogenous variable three-stage-least-squares regressions are presented in columns 1-3.
The first-stage regressions are presented in columns 4-6 so that the determinants of each
of the endogenous variables can be seen.

5.3.1 Risk Retained
In the simultaneous equations, incentives do not appear to play a large role in
determining a company’s risk retention – delta is negative and significant at the 10%
level but vega is insignificant. Both of the incentive variables are strongly correlated with
their past values. Firms which pay more in cash also appear to pay compensation with
higher levels of vega, perhaps in an effort to combat the risk-aversion effects of higher
cash payments. Higher cash pay is associated with less risk retention, indicating that this
could be the case. If boards are setting the optimal level of risk and managers are
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shareholders desire. Older CEOs tend to make riskier decisions, although those who have
been in their jobs longer do not. They do, however, have higher sensitivity to stock price
changes, likely from a build-up of options in their wealth portfolio. Larger firms retain
more risk, as do those who pay more taxes. Firms which undertake riskier investments
also retain more risk – indicating that risk decisions may be made across-the-board. Many
of the structural variables are significant in the first-stage regressions. Notably firms
which display a larger growth in premiums have higher vega in their pay packages and
firms which do more business in long-tailed lines also retain more risk – perhaps firms
are taking on or retaining more risky business than they would otherwise. This does not
seem to be associated with loss ratio – that may play less of a role in the decision of how
much to reinsure than in what to reinsure or how much leverage to bear.
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5.3.2 Business in Long-Tailed Lines
The simultaneous equation regressions show that the contemporaneous incentives
given to executives do not appear to have much effect on the amount of business in
conducted in long-tailed lines. Here, firms which are less concentrated in their business
conduct more business in these lines. These lines of business are also associated with less
correlation with investment and natural hedging and greater variance of losses – the lines
to appear to be more risky but the two effects might cancel each other out.
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5.3.3 Leverage: Premium/Surplus Ratio
Premium/Surplus ratio is not significantly related to an executive’s incentives.
Executives who are paid more than expected take on more leverage although executives
which are paid more in general take on less leverage – the executives who exceed their
expected pay could be being compensated for the high risk of their particular companies
or might have special skills in working at highly levered companies. As expected, the
coefficient on vega is positive, although not significant. It does not appear that executives
are affecting the firm risk through leverage in the way that they are with reinsurance. The
two are negatively correlated, so reinsurance is a substitute for leverage although the
relationship is not significant. Also, companies with more assets in stocks and bonds are
taking on less leverage through writing more premiums relative to surplus. Older
executives appear to make less risky decisions. The other structural variables are not
related to the leverage decision in a meaningful way.
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5.3.4 Leverage: Best’s Capital Adequacy Ratio
Incentives do have some effect on the capital adequacy ratio, but as with the panel
direction they go in the opposite direction as theory predicts. A higher Vega appears to
increase the capital adequacy ratio of firms, so firms where executives have more
incentive to take risk are actually holding more risk-adjusted capital relative to their
business, a counterintuitive result. This may imply that either managers are not
responding to their incentives or that tying their wealth more closely to firm performance
actually discourages risky actions. Of course, because Best’s Adequacy ratio is dependent
on the particular business of firms, it could be that manager s are making less risky
decisions but are focusing more on risk-management policy and this increased focus
results in a higher ratio, while not showing up in the more naïve measurement of leverage
that the premium/surplus ratio represents. Firms where managers have more control have
a lower adequacy ratio, although managers should use their power to make safer
decisions. At the same time firms which pay more cash compensation have a higher ratio,
as well as higher sensitivity of wealth to variance. Companies which retain more risk
have a higher ratio. Most of the results for this simultaneous equation system go in the
opposite direction of what should be expected – managers who should be making riskier
decisions also appear to be taking on less leverage compared with their risk profile and
peers.
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5.4 Firm Decision Effects on Stock-Return Volatility
For compensation incentives to be effective at altering executive behavior it is
necessary that the managerial decision variables have an effect on the market
measurements to which the incentives are tied – stock price and volatility. I regress
several lagged values of each risk measure on the log of the standard deviation of daily
stock returns and present the results in table 12. The lagged and twice-lagged values of
business in long-tailed lines are the only variables significantly associated with risk
policy and they do appear to increase the variance of stock returns – these lines are
actually more risky when it comes to the market’s judgment of firm performance.
Because the measure is the log of a value between zero and one, the negative sign is
actually associated with greater volatility of stock returns. Most of the lagged values have
this sign, except for risk retained in the once-lagged specification, although the results are
not significant at the ten-percent level. Stock variance is also associated with the standard
deviation of premiums, and the rating of the group, with better rated groups exhibiting
less variance. The returns to shareholders are also associated with stock variance and
those stocks with greater returns exhibit greater variance during a one-year period.
Executives with a higher Vega seemed to do relatively less business in risky lines
– they react in the opposite way expected for the one measurement that the market
appears to be considering when variance of returns are determined. This puzzle is
resolved somewhat in the robustness checks in section 6.1 where I find that firms
increase their business in long-tailed lines faster than other premiums. The difference
could be due to lagged reporting requirements and is an area for future research.

Jeremy Skog
- 90 According to these results the firm risk variables which markets pay attention to
are the risk retained, the proportion of business in long-tailed lines and Best’s Capital
Adequacy Ratio. The panel regression results show that executive’s incentives affect risk
retention and the proportion of business in long-tailed lines. The panel regressions found
that executives who had higher sensitivities to stock price volatility were actually doing
less business in long-tailed lines, which seemed counterintuitive but these results indicate
that firms which do less business in these lines have more stock return volatility – at least
in the short term. Thus, executives appear to be behaving rationally in their lines-ofbusiness-business decision and increasing their stock volatility - and hence reward - by
doing so. This is evidence that executives are responding to their incentives. The risk
retained measure, however, goes in the opposite direction. Although executives with
higher sensitivity to stock price volatility retain more risk in their firm, these companies
appear to have lower stock price volatility overall. This effect becomes insignificant
when other control variables are included in the regression, so it is likely another variable
which affects both risk retained and stock price volatility that drives this result.
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5.5 Size of Effects and Relative Importance
Even if managerial incentives are important, there still remains the question of
where they rank as a factor in determining firm decisions. If firm structure is more
important and incentives are a secondary effect then this reduces the importance of
paying a premium to hire any one CEO and give him the right incentives. Alternatively, it
may be because the right CEO has already been hired and given a correct pay package
that the firm structure decision drives effects. Thus, it is difficult to make an argument
about the optimality of the market for executive talent, although I can examine it as it
stands.
Making a manager more sensitive to stock volatility by one standard deviation,
that is increasing his reward from a 0.01 change in stock volatility by $163,000 increases
the risk retention of the firm by about 2% from a mean of 81% to 83% or 1/10th of a
standard deviation, reduces the proportion of business in long-tailed lines by about 8%
from 61% to 53%, would not have any significant effect on the premium/surplus ratio,
and increases Best’s Capital Adequacy ratio by about 25, or 1/3rd of a standard deviation
of this ratio though this last result it not significant. Naturally, the exact effect depends on
which coefficients are used and which specification is preferred. The theoretically
preferred specification uses instrumental variables with controls. Delta rarely appears to
be significant in driving firm decisions and when it is, its effect is much smaller than the
effect due to vega. The only significant effect for delta was in business in long-tailed
lines, where increasing delta by one standard deviation reduces business in thelse lines by
4%. Most of the power of vega is derived from the time-to-maturity of outstanding and
granted options, a factor that is controllable by the granting boards. When included in
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risk and subsumes most of the effect of vega. Clearly, small changes in executive
incentives can have a large effect on corporate decisions, although the actual effect of
these changes and their relative size varies depending on the empirical specification.
To give an idea of how risk decisions respond to level of pay, I note that an
executive seems to increase his group’s risk retention by 0.4% for every $100,000 paid in
cash compensation in the IV regressions. $100,000 is about 1/8th of a standard deviation
of pay for the normal CEO. At the average pay for an executive, risk retention is
increased by 5.6 percent due to this cash pay according to the preferred IV regressions.
Business in long-tailed lined of business does not seem to be affected by cash pay, but an
executive who ages one year increases the proportion of this risky business by 0.18%.
These effects can be put into perspective by looking at the change in firm size necessary
to replicate them. An increase in firm size of one percent will decrease the firm’s risk
retention by about 0.2% according to the IV regression. Note that this increase in firm
size can represent a change of $35 million for the average firm. This illustrates how pay
given to executives can actually be a relatively cheap way of implementing firm policy,
rather than trying to adjust firm structure or the firm’s book of business. These structural
costs increase greatly as firms increase in size, while the costs of incentives rise only with
the wealth of the executive. The actual cost of increasing delta and vega varies with the
executive’s specific wealth and options grants, but adjusting executive compensation is
relatively cheaper, especially for large firms, than changing other aspects of firm
structure such as size, premiums, and business.
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6. Further Robustness Checks
6.1 Change in Business in Long-Tailed Lines
If executives are taking on more relatively risky business in response to their
incentives it should be possible to observe an increase in the business in these lines, even
when controlling for the general increase in business. As before, I estimate two
specifications whose results are presented in table 15. Columns 1and 2 contain the leastsquares fixed-effects regressions while columns 3 and 4 use instrumental variables with
the t-2 value of Vega used to instrument Vegat-1.
The story of decisions for the regressions in sections 6.1-6.3 is as follows: the
executive receives his incentives at the beginning of the year (t-1) in and a level of
premiums is observed. I then measure if the granted incentives have an effect on the
change in the variable and in what change that direction runs, so that I measure how
much growth there is in these variables over a year. The dependent variable is thus the
difference in the observed risk variable. If executives respond to incentives then a higher
vega should lead them to adjust that variable over the coming year. I run regressions both
with and without control variables. The two general equations are:
Equation 13

∆SchedPi ,t = β1υ i ,t −1 + β 3δ i ,t −1 + Yt + η i + ε i ,t
and
Equation 14

∆SchedPi ,t = β 1 X i ,t + β 2υ i ,t −1 + β 3δ i ,t −1 + β 4 C i ,t + Yt + η i + ε it
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represents the standard control variables. Y represents the year dummies.
In most of the regressions incentive variables are insignificant, except for the
instrumental-variable regression with controls. Here, vega is correlated with a positive
growth in premiums in long-tailed lines. Thus, this test provides evidence that executives
are following their incentives to invest more in lines traditionally considered riskier,
although this risk may only manifest itself in the long-term. As expected, the only other
significant determinant in the growth in business in long-tailed lines is the growth in total
business. When controlling for endogeneity, it appears that vega has the effect of
inducing the firm to conduct relatively more of its business in risky lines – more of the
gain in business comes from doing business in risky lines than would be expected. This
indicates that vega may play a role in encouraging executives to take on more risky
business than they otherwise would, although it contradicts the earlier finding that vega
appears to reduce the proportion of business in risky lines.
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6.2 Relative Growth in Business in Property Lines and Liability Lines
Similar to the test in section 6.1, I examine the growth in both property and
liability lines. Liability lines are generally riskier than property lines, so vega should
cause the change in these lines to increase more. Results for the regressions (similar to
those in equations 13 and 14) are presented in tables 16 and 17. Again, the growth in
premiums, the natural hedge due to correlation of investments and losses, and firm size
are the most significant variables In the incentives-only IV regressions in column 3, vega
has a negative effect. The coefficients on vega in column 3 of tables 16 and 17 are
significantly different from each other – business in liability lines drops off significantly
faster than business in property lines when vega is increased. This result implies that a
higher vega leads to the firm taking on less risk, to the extent that liability lines are more
risky than property lines. However, in my earlier robustness tests I could not reject that
these lines were significantly different from each other in their effects on firm risk.
Because I consider the measure of long-tailed lines to be more applicable than the naïve
designation of property and liability, I consider the results of section 6.1 to be more
sensible. However, there is evidence that managers are responding to incentives
selectively by considering what business they focus on.
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6.3 Growth in surplus
I next examine the question of whether or not executives respond to incentives by
changing the level of surplus at the firm. Earlier results indicated little effect on firm
leverage and the earlier robustness tests indicate that managers appear to be reducing the
risk in their business. I also wish to examine whether managers are reducing their surplus
as well – whether the change in the ratio is due to an increase in premiums or a decrease
in surplus. Regressions are run as in sections 6.1 and 6.2. I find that the growth in surplus
is strongly related to the growth in premiums written, as is sensiblem but positively
correlated wit hthe natural hedge, which is counterintuitive. However, column 3, the IV
incentives regression, indicates that firms appear to be reducing surplus in response to a
higher vega. That is they are taking on a more risky action. This could be due to the
correlation of one of the structural variables with both vega and surplus as vega is not
significant in column 4. However, an increase in delta results in a relative decrease in
surplus when firm structure variables are considerd. Given the overall results in tables 1517 and 8, it appears that firms respond to an increase in vega by cutting premiums and
surplus, but not cutting one more strongly than the other. Incentives do not appear to
inspire managers to increase the risk profile of a firm through drastically altering its
leverage in a particular way. This is, naturally, subject to the specification of these
regressions.
This effect only shows up significantly in one specification of the results, so it
cannot be considered to be strongly confirmed, but the coefficients in other specifications
are generally in the same direction, although they are not significant.
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6.4 Management Team Regressions
There is the possibility that decisions are made not solely by the chief executive,
but by the management team as a whole. If this is the case then the incentives given to the
entire management team will be important. I calculate these by summing the values of
delta and vega for each executive at a company in each year. The regressions and results
presented in tables 6-9 are repeated using the equivalent incentive variables for the
management team and results are presented in tales 19-22. As noted in the data
description section, executives at levels below chief executive often receive significantly
less pay, both in cash and incentives.
Regressions on risk retained indicate that delta appears to have little effect on risk
retention, while an increase in vega causes managers to purchase less reinsurance, as
theory predicts. Vega and delta also appear to be negatively associated with the
proportion of business conducted in long-tailed lines, although the effect for vega is not
significant and delta is only significant in one specification. There is only one significant
results when considering the leverage decision – where vega is associated with a higher
adequacy ratio in the fixed-effects regression with no incentives. The other insignificant
specifications indicate that vega incourages leverage while an increase in delta
discourages leverage. These results are similar to the CEO regressions for reinsurance
purchase. The main conclusion to draw from these is that incentives given to the
management team are similar to those given to CEOs and tend to confirm the previous
results.
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6.5 Contemporaneous Instrumental Variable Regressions
To examine the robustness of regression results to model specification, I repeat
the instrumental variable regressions using the contemporaneous (t) values of delta and
vega, instrumenting vega with lagged (t-1) and predicted values. By using
contemporaneous variables, these regressions are similar to the simultaneous equations.
The exact specifications should be clear from tables 23 and 24 – the regressions are
similar to those in columns 4,5 and 6 of tables 6-9.
These regressions indicate that there is little relationship between
contemporaneous incentives and observable firm risk decisions. If the story I propose is
true, then this is because managers are uncertain of the final value of their portfolios and
hence te exact incentives that they have and firms have not had time to incorporate the
decisions fully during the year. Contemporaneous vega is positively associated with more
risk retain when only incentives are examined. Contemporaneous delta decreases the risk
retention as well as the capital adequacy ratio, similar to previous findings. The age and
tenure of the CEO as well as the AM best rating of the group are positively associated
with business decisions, while there are mixed results for the concentration of group
business. Leverage decisions are positively associated geographic diversification,
concentration of ownership, AM Best rating and shareholder return. There are mixed
findings for the loss ratio. Broadly, the incentives story is similar to what is established in
the main regressions, but lagged values provide a better measure of the actual incentives
given to management, given the timing of the variables and the ability to interpret and set
optimal firm policy.
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7. Conclusion
This study provides evidence that the incentives given to managers are an
important determinant of the risk-management decision of insurance groups, although the
statistical significance of their role shifts based on model specification and the decision
being examined. The risk management decisions examined in this paper are a cleaner
measure of corporate risk management than other proxies used in the literature as they are
a pure measure of a company’s risk retention relative to bankruptcy risk and the riskiness
of their business in general. By limiting my analysis to one specific industry, I am also
able to include industry-specific control variables directly related to the business the firm
conducts. This is an advancement of this study over others in the risk-management field.
Managerial incentives appear to have an important effect on risk retention and are
more important than several firm structure factors. The specific results of the examination
of firm decisions and their relationship to risk management presented in this paper
represent a puzzle. Executives do appear to be responding to the incentives that they are
given in their compensation packages by retaining more of their business risk on firm's
own books, but they also appear to be conducting less business in risky lines. Perhaps
executives are selectively choosing to reinsure less of their preferred risk while
conducting less risky business in general.
The market appears to be basing its valuation of the firm mainly on the general
riskiness of the firm’s business – what proportion of the firm’s premiums come from
long-tailed lines. My results indicate that firms with more business in risky lines seem
less volatile and this coincides with the results from the firm-decision regressions. If
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which causes the market to reward them. Executives should therefore be particularly
sensitive to this decision variable when determining their firm policy. The leverage
decision does not seem to be affected by executive incentives – they are finding other
ways of responding.
It is important to examine the strategies of groups, rather than individual
companies, especially in the insurance industry, where intra-group reinsurance has
significant effects on the cost of capital faced by an individual company and which can
only be accurately accounted for by examination at the group level. Further, I show that it
is important to include managerial, as well as structural, incentives when examining the
decision processes of a firm. A useful robustness check would to be to examine banks,
investment houses, and other risk-bearing institutions to see if these risk and incentive
connections hold. Further expanding the insurance data set could also help to resolve
some of the effects where managers seem to be operating contrary to their risk-reward
incentives.
This study has examined executive compensation as a key policy variable of
firms. It has been shown here that risk-management decisions are significantly
determined by managerial incentives, although not always as theory would predict, and it
may be that this variable is one path by which incentives affect firm performance. The
data set may also be used to provide detailed answers to other questions of to the
insurance industry and their relation to the management team. Thus, there is significant
opportunity for future research in this promising field.
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Appendix 1: Insurance Lines of Business
Line Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
10
11.1
11.2
12
13
14
15
16
17.1
17.2
18.1
18.2
19.1
19.2
19.3
19.4
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Line Description
Fire P
Allied Lines P
Farmowners Multiple Peril*
Homeowners Multiple Peril*
Commercial Multiple Peril*
Mortgage Guaranty
Ocean Marine*
Inland Marine P
Financial Guaranty
Medical Malpractice (Occurrence)*L
Medical Malpractice (Claims Made) L
Earthquake P
Group Accident and Health
Credit Accident and Health (Group and Individual)
Other Accident and Health
Workers Compensation* L
Other Liability (Occurrence)* L
Other Liability (Claims Made) L
Products Liability (Occurrence)* L
Products Liability (Claims Made) L
Private Passenger Auto Liability* L
Private Passenger Auto Liability* L
Commercial Auto Liability* L
Commercial Auto Liability* L
Auto Physical Damage P
Aircraft (All Perils)*
Fidelity
Surety
Glass
Burglary and Theft P
Boiler and Machinery*
Credit
International*
Reinsurance (Non-Proportional Assumed – Property)*
Reinsurance (Non-Proportional Assumed – Liability)*
Reinsurance (Non-Proportional Assumed – Financial Lines)*
Aggregate Other

* = Denotes Long-Tailed line as identified in Phillips, Cummins & Allen(1996). Adjustments are made for
lines whose definitions have since changed, particularly in claims vs. occurrence based lines.
L
= Line is defined as mainly a Liability line
P
= Line is defined as mainly a Property line
Lines 7 and 20 are historical do not exist for the years in this data set
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Appendix 2: Insurance Group Names Appearing In Data Set
ACE LTD
AETNA LIFE &
CASUALTY
ALLIED GROUP
ALLSTATE INS GRP
AMBAC
ASSURANCE CORP
AMERICAN
FINANCIAL INS GRP
AMERICAN
HEALTHCARE
SPECIALTY
AMERICAN INTL
GRP
AMERIN GROUP
AMERISURE
COMPANIES
AXIS Capital Grp
American Financial
Grp
Arch Ins Grp
BANKERS INS GRP
CAPITOL COUNTY
GRP
CENTRIS GROUP
INC
CHUBB & SON INC
CIGNA HEALTH
GRP
CINCINNATI FNCL
CP
CMAC GROUP
CNA INS GRP
CRUM & FORSTER I
C
ENHANCE FNCL
GRP
EXECUTIVE RISK
COMPANIES
FIDELITY NATL FIN
INC

FIRST AMN TITLE
FIRST STATE GROUP
FRONTIER INS GRP
GE GLOBAL GRP
GENERAL ELECTRIC
GENERAL
REINSURANCE CP
GOVERNMENT
EMPLYS
GREAT AMER PROP &
CAS
HARTFORD FIRE &
CASUALTY GROUP
HARTFORD STEAM
BOILER GRP
HORACE MANN
GROUP
INTEGON CORP
INTERCARGO CORP
GRP
Infinity Prop & Cas Ins
Grp
LEUCADIA GRP
LINCOLN NATIONAL
LUMBERMENS MUT
CAS GRP
MASTERCARE CO INC
METROPOLITAN GRP
MGIC GRP
MILWAUKEE INS GRP
MORTGAGE
GUARANTY CORP S/G
OF
MUNICIPAL BOND INV
ASR CORP GRP
MUTUAL ASSURANCE
NAC RE CORP
OHIO CASUALTY GRP
OLD REPUBLIC GRP

OMNI INS GRP
ORION CAPITAL
GROUP
PMI GROUP OF
COMPANIES
PROGRESSIVE GRP
PROTECTIVE LIFE INS
GRP
ProAssurance Corp Grp
RHINE RE GRP
RLI INSURANCE GROUP
Radian Grp
SAFECO INSURANCE
GROUP
SCOR REINS CO
SELECTIVE
INSURANCE
SENTRY INSURANCE
GROUP
SKANDIA AMERICA
GROUP
ST PAUL COMPANIES
SUTTER INS GRP
TRENWICK GROUP INC
UNITRIN GRP
US FIDELITY &
GUARANTY GROUP
W R BERKLEY CORP
WABASH LIFE
INSURANCE GROUP
WHITE MOUNTAINS
GROUP
WILLIAM LIFE INS
GROUP
X L AMERICA
ZENITH NATIONAL INS
GRP
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Appendix 3: Correlation Coefficient Matrix
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